Touro Law Review
Volume 21
Number 1 New York State Constitutional
Decisions: 2004 Compilation

Article 8

December 2014

Supreme Court, New York County, People v. Garcia
Yale Pollack

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Pollack, Yale (2014) "Supreme Court, New York County, People v. Garcia," Touro Law Review: Vol. 21: No.
1, Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/8

This Due Process is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Supreme Court, New York County, People v. Garcia
Cover Page Footnote
21-1

This due process is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/8

SUPREME
COURT
Pollack: Due
ProcessOF NEW YORK
People v. Garcia'
(decided March 11, 2004)
On January 30, 2004, defendant Michael Garcia was
"convicted of attempted assault in the second degree, assault in the
third degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree,
criminal mischief in the third degree, endangering the welfare of a
child, and aggravated cruelty to animals."2 Defendant moved to
dismiss the aggravating cruelty to animals charge contending that
the definition of "companion animal," in Agriculture and Markets
Law Section 353-a,3 was unconstitutionally vague.'

The court

denied the defendant's motion to dismiss in its entirety.'
On August 2, 2003, the defendant went to the home of
Emalie Martinez with a gravity knife and assaulted her.' He also
committed various other crimes against Ms. Martinez's roommate
and her three children.'

That same day, defendant took a ten-

gallon fish tank that belonged to the children and threw it into their
television screen, breaking both the television and fish tank.'
'777 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
21d.at 847.
3N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a(l) (McKinney 1999) provides:

A person is guilty of aggravated cruelty to animals when, with
no justifiable purpose, he or she intentionally kills or
intentionally causes serious physical injury to a companion
animal with aggravated cruelty. For purposes of this section,
"aggravated cruelty" shall mean conduct which:
(i) is
done
or
intended to cause extreme physical pain; or (ii) is
manner.
or
sadistic
depraved
especially
carried out in an
4 Garcia,777 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
51d.

61d.
71d.
8

1d.
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Defendant then called one of the children into the room and said,
"Hey, Juan, want to see something cool?"9

Thereafter, the

defendant crushed one of the three goldfish writhing on the floor
with the heel of his shoe.°
The defendant was convicted of killing a companion animal
due to the context of the situation by which he committed the act.
The goldfish in the family's aquarium all had names and were
regularly looked after in terms of making sure the fish tank was
clean and that the fish were fed."

The defendant awoke Ms.

Martinez by threatening to throw the fish tank at her head before
2
actually throwing it in to the family's entertainment center.
Furthermore, he deliberately called Juan into the room to make
sure that the child witnessed the killing of the goldfish. 3
The defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of aggravated
cruelty to animals was based on his right to due process granted in
both

the United States Constitution

4

and the New York

Constitution.5

Under New York's Agriculture and Markets Law Section
350, a "companion animal" is defined as "any dog or cat, and shall
also mean any other domesticated animal normally maintained in
9 Garcia,777 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
1°Id.

" Id.at 851.
12

Id. at 852.

13Id
14U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... "
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or near the household of the owner or person who cares for such
other domesticated animal" while an "animal" is defined as "every
living creature except a human being." 6

In People v. Garcia,

Garcia argued that the statute was vague on its face because there
were no adequate warnings as to which animals were protected as
companion animals. 7 The defendant also argued that the statute
was vague as applied to him since a goldfish cannot be considered
a companion animal. 8
The Garciacourt noted that its "first duty is to examine the
natural and obvious meaning of the words and language employed
in a statute to determine the intent of the Legislature."' 9 If the
statute is still unclear, the court will look to other sources such as
the context of the statue, the mischief the statue looks to remedy,
legislative history, and state public policy.2" The court found that
the definition of animal in the statute was in conformity with
dictionary definitions of the term and that it was plain and
unambiguous. 2' As to the meaning of "companion animal," the
court found that the statutory definition was sufficient and not
vague as a "potential offender of ordinary intelligence ...

would

be adequately informed of the nature of the offense prohibited by

15N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
16N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 350 (McKinney
1999).
17Garcia, 777 N.Y.S. at
849.
18Id.
'9Id.at 850.
20 id.
21

Id. at 850-51.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 [2013], Art. 8

TOURO LA WREVIEW

the statute.

22

[Vol 2 1

The goldfish that was killed by the defendant had a

name and was regularly looked after by both the mother and
children. 23 These factors led the court to conclude the goldfish was
a companion animal that was intended to be protected under the
statute. 4
New York public policy was also examined by the court in
rendering its decision as the court looked at how the statute was
interpreted in the past. In 1988, there was a case where the court
found game cocks to be protected under a statute that prohibited
any premises from charging money to see animals fight.2 5 The
statute also protected sea turtles after they were found to have their
fins perforated by the defendant even though the sea turtles were in
no way considered companion animals.26
A companion animal "need only be cared for and
maintained in or near the household of its human owner.

27

The

goldfish in Garciawas a companion animal that was killed in front
of the mother and children after the defendant got their attention."
The acts "clearly evince defendant's understanding and intention
of inflicting emotional pain on both the boy and his mother."29

22

Garcia, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 851.

23 Id.
24 Id.
25
26

Id at 852 (citing People v. Klock, 16 N.Y. St. 565 (4th Dep't 1988)).
Id. (citing People v. Downs, 136 N.Y.S. 440 (NewYork City Magis. Ct.

1911)).
27 Garcia, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
28 Id.
29 id.
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In Connally v. General Construction Co.,3" the United
States Supreme Court defined a violation of due process as "a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application." 3 '

Due process

ensures that a defendant has notice that his actions would
constitute a crime under certain circumstances.
The standards for vagueness were refined in subsequent
United States Supreme Court decisions.

In United States v.

Salerno,32 the Court defined a facial vagueness standard that put
the burden on the challenger to establish "that no set of
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid."33
The statute challenged in Salerno was The Bail Reform Act of
1984, which gave the federal courts the power to "detain an
arrestee pending trial if the Government demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release
conditions 'will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other
person and the community.'

""

In Salerno, the defendants were

detained after being charged under "a 29-count indictment alleging
various Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) violations, mail and wire fraud offenses, extortion, and
various criminal gambling violations.'"35 The Government moved

30 269 U.S. 385 (1926).

31 Id. at 391 (citing Int'l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914)).
32481 U.S. 739 (1987).
31 Id. at 745.
34
1d. at 741. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1982).
3
1Id. at 743.
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to detain the defendants under The Bail Reform Act stating that
"no condition of release would assure the safety of the community
or any person.

'36

The Court found that the Act was not facially

vague since the detention of those charged with serious felonies
may pose a threat to the community, and such threats are a primary
concern of every government. 7
The facial vagueness standard is more difficult for a
challenger to overcome than the "as-applied" vagueness standard
that was set forth in Chapman v. United States." "An 'as-applied'
challenge ...

requires a court only to consider whether the statute

can be constitutionally applied to the defendant under the
particular facts of the case."39 If a statute does provide a defendant
with adequate notice, a court will inquire no further and the statute
will not violate due process.

°

Furthermore, if an "as-applied"

challenge fails, the facial challenge will fail as well since the court
will have found that, at the very least, the statute was not vague as
applied to the defendant himself. Therefore, a set of circumstances
exists under which the statute is valid.4

In Chapman, the

defendants were convicted of selling ten sheets of blotter paper
LSD that weighed approximately 5.7 grams although the weight of
the LSD alone was about 50 milligrams. 2 Section 841(b)(1)(B)(v)
36 Id.

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
U.S. 453 (1991).
39 Garcia,777 N.Y.S.2d at 848 (citing Chapman, 500 U.S. at 467-68).
40
Id. (citing People v. Nelson, 506 N.E.2d 907, 909 (N.Y. 1987)).
17

38500

41

Id. (citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455

U.S. 489, 495 (1982); People v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28, 36-37 (N.Y. 2003)).
42

Chapman, 500 U.S. at 455.
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of Title 21 of the United States Code created a mandatory
minimum sentence of five years "for distributing more than 1 gram
of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
LSD"43 and the defendants were convicted under that section based
on the 5.7 gram weight of the substances they possessed."

The

defendants argued that the paper itself should not have been used
in calculating the weight of the substance for sentencing purposes
and including the weight of the paper was error since that was only
a medium to carry the substance.45 The Court found that the statute
was not vague and that the carrier medium should be included in
calculating the weight of the substance in determining the
appropriate sentence. 6 It reasoned that the ordinary meaning of
the word "mixture" was defined as" 'a portion of matter consisting
of two or more components that do not bear a fixed proportion to
one another and that however thoroughly commingled are regarded
as retaining separate existence.' ""
The New York courts follow the same standards as the
United States Supreme Court when analyzing whether or not a
statute is vague.

The New York Court of Appeals thoroughly

examined facial and "as-applied" challenges in People v. Stuart.48
In Stuart, the defendant challenged an anti-stalking statute49 as
43

Id. at 456.

"Id

45 Id.

4Id. at 468.
Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462 (citing WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY 1149 (1986)).
47

THIRD NEW INT'L

Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 35.
49N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45 (McKinney 1999) provides in pertinent part:
48
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unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as-applied to him."
The defendant had followed a woman on several occasions, along
with giving her gifts that he insisted that she take." The defendant
followed the woman to a coffee shop, deli, library, school,
gymnasium, and other stores and restaurants for over a month.5
After her fifth complaint to the police, the defendant was arrested
and charged for stalking the woman. 3 The defendant claimed that
the language of the statute failed "to provide adequate notice of
what conduct it prohibits. ' '54 The defendant was convicted because

the trial court found that "the statute satisfied the requirements of
due process.

'55

The Court of Appeals noted that "[i]n pursuing a

facial challenge, the defendant must carry the 'heavy burden' of
showing that the statute is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications.

56

If a challenger is successful in a facial challenge,

the law is " 'invalid in toto - and therefore incapable of any valid

A person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree when he or

she intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a
course of conduct directed at a specific person, and knows or
reasonably should know that such conduct: (1) is likely to
cause reasonable fear of material harm of such person, a
member of such person's immediate family or a third party
with whom such person is acquainted; or (2) causes material
harm to the mental or emotional health of such person,... and
the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that
conduct.
50 Stuart, 797 N.E.2d
at 30.
51
Id. at 30-31.
52 Id.

53

1d. at 31.

54 Id.
55 Stuart, 797

N.E.2d at 31.
Id. at 35 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745; Matter of Wood v. Irving, 647
N.E.2d 1332 (N.Y. 1995)).
56
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appfication.'4"57 ' In regard to the as-applied challenge, the role of
the court is to decide "Whether the assailed statute is impermissibly
vague as'applied to the defendant."

8

If there is adequate notice,"

'[t]he court will not strain to imagine marginal situations in which
the applicatioi of'the statute is not so clear.'

""

The court in

Stuart affirmed the defendant's conviction finding that the statute
wa s not vague as-applied to the defendant and therefore not vague
on its face aswell.6
The same statute challenged by the defendant in Garcia
was addressed in People v. Knowles.6 In Knowles, the defendant
kicked a dog down a walkway and then picked it up and threw it
against abiick wall.62 The defendant challenged the charge of
aggravated 'cruelty to animals' claiming that the phrases
'aggravated- cruelty," "extreme physical pain," and "especially
depraved or sadistic manner" were too vague and therefore
violated his due process rights.63

In analyzing the defendant's

challenge, the court stated that "[u]nskilled draftsmanship alone is
no ground for declaring a statute void, and if an intent can be
spelled out fairly from the words used, effect will be given to that
intent, although such intent is not artistically expressed."'

The

court further stated that "[f]ailure• to define every word in a
51Id. (quoting

58 Id.at 36.

Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974)).

59 Id. (quoting Nelson, 506 N.E.2d at 909).
60 Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 41.
61709 N.Y.S.2d 916 (N.Y. County Ct. 2000).
Id.at 920.
*63 Id. at 919.
"
.

64

Id.
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criminal statute does not make the statute unconstitutionally
vague."65 The statute was found to clearly cover the types of
actions committed by the defendant and therefore was not
unconstitutionally vague.66
In conclusion, New York follows the same analysis at the
United States Supreme Court when determining a claim of
statutory vagueness.

Both look at the facial and "as-applied"

validity of the statute to reach a conclusion as to whether the
statute is vague and would violate the defendant's due process
rights. "As-applied" challenges are viewed on an ad hoc basis
since courts will have to determine whether or not the statute is
vague as to a particular defendant while a facial challenge looks at
the language of the statute itself. In analyzing the statute, courts
will look at legislative history, pubic policy, and other factors that
would clarify the purpose of the statute. Courts will not strain to
find a statute ambiguous if a person of ordinary intelligence would
be on notice of the crime that is targeted.
Yale Pollack

65 Id.

" Knowles, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/8
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EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

UnitedStates ConstitutionAmendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
Assistance of Counselfor his defence.

. .

have the

New York ConstitutionArticle I, Section 6:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person with counsel as in civil
actions ....
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